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In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives
are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case,
it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all players receive equal incentives
from the common pool. The question arises, however, what is the optimal distribution of
institutional incentives? How should we best reward and punish individuals for cooperation
to thrive? We study this problem for the public goods game on a scale-free network. We
show that if the synergetic effects of group interactions are weak, the level of cooperation
in the population can be maximized simply by adopting the simplest “equal distribution”
scheme. If synergetic effects are strong, however, it is best to reward high-degree nodes
more than low-degree nodes. These distribution schemes for institutional rewards are
independent of payoff normalization. For institutional punishment, however, the same
optimization problem is more complex, and its solution depends on whether absolute
or degree-normalized payoffs are used. We find that degree-normalized payoffs require
high-degree nodes be punished more lenient than low-degree nodes. Conversely, if
absolute payoffs count, then high-degree nodes should be punished stronger than
low-degree nodes.
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INTRODUCTION
In human societies, cooperation is essential for the maintenance
of public goods. However, the collapse of cooperation happens
often in many public goods dilemmas which we nowadays face,
like protecting the global climate or avoiding overfishing of our
oceans (Hardin, 1968; O’Neill and Oppenheimer, 2002). For
avoiding the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), we often
rely on institutions to enforce public cooperation and acceptable
behavior. Although institutionalized punishment appears to be
more common than institutionalized reward, both concepts are
in use throughout the world. Recently, ample research efforts have
been devoted to the study of the emergence of institutions and
their effectiveness in promoting prosocial behavior (Yamagishi,
1986; Ostrom, 1990; Gurerk et al., 2006; Henrich, 2006; Cuesta
et al., 2008; Sigmund et al., 2010; Baldassarri and Grossman,
2011; Sasaki and Unemi, 2011; Szolnoki et al., 2011a,b; Cressman
et al., 2012; Isakov and Rand, 2012; Sasaki et al., 2012; Bechtel
and Scheve, 2013; Cressman et al., 2013; Vasconcelos et al., 2013;
Vukov et al., 2013). It has been shown, for example, that insti-
tutional rewarding promotes the evolution of cooperation in the
liner public goods game (Cuesta et al., 2008), the nonlinear public
goods games (Chen et al., 2013), and in structured populations
in general (Jiménez et al., 2008, 2009; Szolnoki et al., 2011a,b).
However, institutional punishment is less costly and thus more
effective to warrant a given level of public cooperation, especially
if participation in the public goods game is optional (Sasaki et al.,
2012; Sasaki, 2013).
Besides the obvious stick vs. carrot dilemma (Hilbe and
Sigmund, 2010; Szolnoki and Perc, 2012, 2013), the question
emerges how to best make use of the available resources, which
inevitably are finite (Perc, 2012; Chen and Perc, 2014). In par-
ticular, we wish to make optimal use of different forms of reci-
procity to promote human cooperation (Poteete et al., 2010;
Gracia-Lázaro et al., 2012a,b; Exadaktylos et al., 2013; Rand and
Nowak, 2013). One plausible approach appears to be allocat-
ing the resources depending on the properties of the interaction
network that describes the connections among us. Surprisingly,
few studies have thus far considered the problem of the opti-
mal allocation of incentives for maximizing public cooperation.
Traditionally, all groups and all individuals are considered equal,
and depending on their strategies thus deserved of the same
reward or punishment (Jiménez et al., 2008; Sasaki et al., 2012;
Chen et al., 2013). This simple assumption, however, does not
agree with the fact that in social networks individuals have dif-
ferent roles, which depend significantly on the degree of the node
that they occupy. Indeed, the prominent role of heterogeneous
interaction networks for the successful evolution of cooperation
is firmly established and well known (Santos and Pacheco, 2005;
Santos et al., 2006a,b; Gómez-Gardeñes et al., 2007; Fu et al.,
2007; Masuda, 2007; Tanimoto, 2007; Tomassini et al., 2007;
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Assenza et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2008; Santos et al., 2008; Floría et al.,
2009; Fu et al., 2009; Pacheco et al., 2009; Peña et al., 2009; Poncela
et al., 2009; Tanimoto, 2009; Brede, 2011; Gómez-Gardeñes et al.,
2011; Kovárˇík et al., 2012; Pinheiro et al., 2012; Tanimoto et al.,
2012; Simko and Csermely, 2013; Tanimoto, 2013), and the rea-
sonable assumption is that the incentives should likely also be
distributed accordingly for optimal evolutionary outcomes. In the
framework of evolutionary graph theory the interaction groups
are diverse, and naturally thus the provided incentives within each
group should also be different. The number of links an individ-
ual player has is traditionally assumed to be a good proxy for that
player’s influence and importance. In this sense, it is interesting
and highly relevant to determine how to distribute the incentives
in the light of this heterogeneity.
Here we consider the spatial public goods game (Szolnoki
et al., 2009) with institutional reciprocity on a scale-free network
(Barabási and Albert, 1999; Albert and Barabási, 2002), where
the assumption is that the incentives at disposal for rewarding
cooperators and punishing defectors are limited. We assume that
the budget available to each group is proportional to its size,
and that the distribution of the incentives depends on the num-
ber of individual links within the group. Our aim is to arrive
at a thorough understanding of how the incentives should be
best distributed to maximize public cooperation. In what follows,
we present the results obtained with the model described in the
Methods section, to where we refer for details. As we will show,
if the enhancement factor r is small, the level of cooperation can
be maximized simply by adopting the simplest “equal distribu-
tion” scheme. If the value of r is large, however, it is best to reward
high-degree nodes more than low-degree nodes. Unlike for insti-
tutionalized rewards, the optimal distribution of resources within
the framework of institutional punishment depends on whether
absolute or degree-normalized payoffs are used. High-degree
nodes should be punished more lenient than low-degree nodes if
degree-normalized payoffs apply, while high-degree nodes should
be punished stronger than low-degree nodes if absolute payoffs
count.
RESULTS
We perform Monte Carlo simulations of the public goods game
described in the Methods section, whereby we consider sepa-
rately institutional rewarding with absolute payoffs and institu-
tional punishment with absolute payoffs, as well as institutional
rewarding with degree-normalized payoffs and institutional pun-
ishment with degree-normalized payoffs. As the key parameters
we consider the enhancement factor r, the average amount of
available incentives δ, and the distribution strength of incentives
α (seeMethods for details). We determine the stationary fractions
of cooperators in the stationary state on networks comprising
N = 1000 to 10, 000 nodes. The final results are averaged over
100 independent initial conditions to further enhance accuracy.
INSTITUTIONAL REWARDING WITH ABSOLUTE PAYOFFS
Figure 1 shows the stationary fraction of cooperators for two
different values of the enhancement factor r. When the enhance-
ment factor is small (Figures 1A,C), defectors always dominate if
δ < 0.2, and this regardless of the value of α. For intermediate
values of δ, the cooperation level can be maximized at an inter-
mediate value of the distribution strength α, which ought to be
close to zero. This indicates that an equal distribution of positive
incentives, regardless of the degree of players within the group, is
the optimal distribution scheme for public cooperation. For high
values of δ, the cooperation level increases with increasing the
value of α. If the enhancement factor r increases (Figures 1B,D),
defectors still dominate for small values of δ and regardless of the
value of α. However, the nonmonotonous dependence of the frac-
tion of cooperators on the distribution strength α disappears for
intermediate values of δ. Instead, the highest cooperation level is
attainable for large values of α.
Intuitively, it is possible to understand that when the enhance-
ment factor is small, a modest positive incentive is not enough
to reverse the doom of cooperators, no matter which distribution
scheme is used (Sasaki et al., 2012). Conversely, if the incentives
are large and targeted preferentially toward influential players,
they can have a high payoff even if the part stemming from the
public goods game is small. In agreement with the traditional
argument of network reciprocity (Nowak and May, 1992; Santos
and Pacheco, 2005; Wang et al., 2013), only cooperators are able
to forge a long-term advantage out of this favorable situation and
build sizable cooperative groups. Thus, for high-enough values
of α, which favor the distribution of rewards toward high-degree
nodes, the evolution of public cooperation is successful.
To gain an understanding of the optimal intermediate value of
the average amount of available incentives δ requires more effort.
First, we show in Figure 2 the payoff differences between coop-
erators and defectors as well as the fraction of cooperators as a
function of degree k during different typical evolutionary stages of
the game. We observe that for α = 0, which implies an “equal dis-
tribution” scheme irrespective of the degree of players, the payoff
of cooperators is higher than that of the corresponding defec-
tors, and this regardless of k. Thus, cooperators can successfully
occupy all nodes of the networks. In contrast, for negative val-
ues of α, the payoff of cooperators with high or middle degree
is less than that of the corresponding defectors, while coopera-
tors with low degree have a higher mean payoff than defectors
with small degree. Because there are interconnections among dif-
ferent types of nodes, and because the Fermi strategy updating
rule is adopted, cooperators can coexist with defectors at equilib-
rium. But defectors can occupy most of the nodes in the network,
since low-degree cooperators do not obtain a high enough pay-
off to spread their strategy across the network. For positive values
of α, the payoff of cooperators with high and middle degree is
larger than that of the corresponding defectors, while cooperators
with low degree have a lower mean payoff than defectors with low
degree. In addition, high-degree cooperators obtain a sufficiently
high payoff through institutional rewarding that enables them to
spread the cooperative strategy also toward some of the auxil-
iary low-degree nodes. Accordingly, cooperative behavior prevails
over defection, but the stationary state is still a mixed C + D
phase—cooperators are unable to dominate completely.
To further corroborate our arguments, we show in Figure 3 the
payoff difference between cooperators and defectors as well as the
fraction of cooperators in dependence on degree k, as obtained for
a two times larger value of r than used in Figure 2. In comparison,
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FIGURE 1 | Evolution of cooperation with institutional rewarding and
absolute payoffs. Top row depicts the stationary fraction of cooperators as a
functionof theaverageamountof available incentives δ for different valuesof the
distribution strength α. The enhancement factor is r = 1 in (A) and r = 2 in (B).
Bottom row depicts the contour plot of the fraction of cooperators as a function
of α and δ, as obtained for the enhancement factor r = 1 in (C) and r = 2 in (D).
it can be observed that for α ≤ 0 the results remain unchanged.
For α > 0, on the other hand, the process of evolution is differ-
ent from what we have presented in Figure 2. During the early
stages of evolution (Figures 3A,B), cooperators with low degree
can have a lower mean payoff than low-degree defectors, while
cooperators with middle and high degree can have a higher mean
payoff than the corresponding defectors. Further in time, coop-
erators succeed in occupying all high-degree nodes (Figure 3G),
and even low-degree cooperators have a payoff comparable to that
of low-degree defectors (Figure 3C). Cooperators can eventually
invade the whole network (Figure 3H), thus giving rise to the
absorbing C phase at r = 2, which emerges for sufficiently large
values of α and intermediate values of δ.
INSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENT WITH ABSOLUTE PAYOFFS
Figure 4 shows that when the enhancement factor is small, coop-
erators are unable to survive for small values of δ, and this
irrespective of the value of α. For intermediate values of δ, the
highest cooperation level is attained at an intermediate value of
the distribution strength α, which is almost equal to zero, like by
the consideration of institutional reward in the preceding subsec-
tion. This indicates that, for small enhancement factors, in case
of institutional punishment too an “equal distribution” scheme
works best for the evolution of public cooperation. If δ is large—if
resources for punishment abound—cooperators can always dom-
inate, regardless of the value of α. For a two times larger value or
r cooperators are favored even more, so that the nonmonotonous
dependence of the cooperation level on α at intermediate val-
ues of δ vanishes. Instead, the fraction of cooperators simply
increases with increasing values of α. Thus, the more the high-
degree defectors are punished, the better for the evolution of
public cooperation.
It is understandable that low values of r, paired with mod-
est resources for punishing defectors, lead to the dominance of
defectors, regardless of the value of α. Conversely, if the resources
abound, defectors are punished severely and cooperators domi-
nate. In this limit example the distribution of fines between low,
middle and high degree nodes does not play an important role.
If, however, the combination of values of r and δ just barely,
or not at all, support the survivability of cooperators, then the
value of α, and thus the particular distribution of incentives (in
this case fines), plays a significant role. With the aim to explain
this nontrivial dependence on α, we show in Figure 5 the pay-
off difference between cooperators and defectors as well as the
fraction of cooperators as a function of degree k during differ-
ent stages of the evolutionary process. It can be observed that
for α = 0 cooperators can always have a higher payoff than the
defectors with the same corresponding degree (Figures 5A–C).
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FIGURE 2 | Time evolution of the mean payoff difference between
cooperators and defectors (A–D) and the fraction of cooperators (E–H) as a
function of degree k for three typical values of α. Institutional rewarding and
absolute payoffs apply. The insets of (A,B) show the mean payoff difference
between cooperators and defectors for low-degree and middle-degree nodes
during the early stages of evolution. During the evolutionary process, if the
enhancement factor is small, cooperatorsalwayshaveahighermeanpayoff than
defectors at an intermediate value of α. Parameter values are r = 1 and δ = 0.5.
FIGURE 3 | The same results as presented in Figure 2, as obtained for a larger enhancement factor but a smaller average amount of available
incentives. Parameter values are r = 2 and δ = 0.3.
Cooperators can thus rise to complete dominance. While for
α < 0, however, low-degree cooperators can have a higher mean
payoff than low-degree defectors, while cooperators with middle
or high degree can’t match the corresponding defectors during
the early stages of the evolution (Figure 5A). Defectors can there-
fore, over time, occupy the high-degree and middle-degree nodes
(Figure 5F). This invasion can decrease the fraction of cooper-
ators on low-degree nodes (Chen et al., 2008). Accordingly, the
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FIGURE 4 | Evolution of cooperation with institutional punishment and
absolute payoffs. Top row depicts the stationary fraction of cooperators as a
functionof theaverageamountof available incentives δ for different valuesof the
distribution strength α. The enhancement factor is r = 1 in (A) and r = 2 in (B).
Bottom row depicts the contour plot of the fraction of cooperators as a function
of α and δ, as obtained for the enhancement factor r = 1 in (C) and r = 2 in (D).
payoff difference between cooperators and defectors on these
nodes continues to be negative, although low-degree defectors
receive the negative incentives. Ultimately cooperators therefore
die out. For α > 0, on the other hand, defectors with higher
degree are punished preferentially—they receive a bigger share
of fines from the available fond than low-degree defectors. Due
to the small enhancement factor and the institutional punish-
ment, both high-degree cooperators and high-degree defectors
have negative payoffs. In fact, low-degree players can have a
higher payoff than high-degree players, despite of the fact that
we use absolute payoffs in this particular case. Either way, defec-
tors can easily invade low-degree nodes (Figure 5F), and they can
spread further toward middle and high degree nodes, although
at the beginning of evolution cooperators have a higher payoff
than defectors on these nodes. The ultimate consequence is that
defectors dominate completely (Figure 5H).
It remains of interest to explain why the dependence on α
disappears at intermediate values of δ for r = 2. For this pur-
pose, we show in Figure 6 the same quantities as in Figure 5,
from where it follows that the results do not change for α ≤ 0.
However, for α > 0 the differences are clearly inferable. For r = 2
the high-degree cooperators can obtain a positive payoff, and nat-
urally they then have a higher payoff than high-degree defectors,
because the latter receive ample negative incentives from the
institutional punishment pool (Figures 6A–C). Cooperators can
therefore occupy high-degree nodes and from there spread across
the whole population (Figure 6G), and this the more effectively
the higher the value of α.
INSTITUTIONAL REWARDING WITH DEGREE-NORMALIZED PAYOFFS
From here onwards we turn to considering degree-normalized
payoffs, which can have important negative consequences for
the evolution of public cooperation in heterogeneous envi-
ronments if compared to absolute payoffs (Masuda, 2007;
Tomassini et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2007; Szolnoki et al., 2008;
Maciejewski et al., 2014). As shown in Figure 7, the frac-
tion of cooperators unsurprisingly increases with increasing δ
for various distribution strength α (top panels). Furthermore,
at small values of r, for small values of δ defectors always
dominate, regardless of the value of α, while for intermedi-
ate values of δ cooperators recover gradually as α increases.
For high δ values there exists an intermediate close-to-zero
value of α that maximizes the stationary fraction of coopera-
tors (Figures 7A,D). When the enhancement factor is larger, the
extent of the parameter region where the nonmonotonous phe-
nomenon can be observed decreased. Instead, for high values
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FIGURE 5 | Time evolution of the mean payoff difference between
cooperators and defectors (A–D) and the fraction of cooperators
(E–H) as a function of degree k for three typical values of α.
Institutional punishment and absolute payoffs apply. The insets of (A,B)
show the mean payoff difference between cooperators and defectors
for low-degree and middle-degree nodes during the early stages of
evolution. During the evolutionary process, if the enhancement factor
is small, cooperators always have a higher mean payoff than defectors
at an intermediate value of δ. Parameter values are r = 1 and
δ = 0.5.
FIGURE 6 | Time evolution of the mean payoff difference between
cooperators and defectors (A–D) and the fraction of cooperators
(E–H) as a function of degree k for three typical values of α, as
obtained for a larger enhancement factor but a smaller average
amount of available incentives than used in Figure 5. Parameter
values are r = 2 and δ = 0.3.
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of δ, the cooperation level increases with increasing values of
α and the area of complete cooperator dominance increases
as well (Figures 7E,F). If comparing the results presented in
Figure 7 with those presented in Figure 1, we find that the
nonmonotonous phenomenon still exists, and it can appear
even at larger values of r because of the consideration of
degree-normalized payoffs. In general, however, the explanation
of these results and the evolutionary mechanisms behind are the
same as those described when considering institutional rewarding
with absolute payoffs.
INSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENT WITH DEGREE-NORMALIZED PAYOFFS
Lastly, we consider institutional punishment with degree-
normalized payoffs. From the results presented in Figure 8 it
follows that the stationary fraction of cooperators increases with
increasing values of δ, and this regardless of the value of α
(top panels). When the enhancement factor is small, we can
see that the nonmonotonous dependence of the fraction of
cooperators on α exists at intermediate values of the average
incentive δ (Figure 8D). When the enhancement factor increases,
this phenomenon still exists, but the extent of the parameter
region where the nonmonotonous dependence can be observed
decreases (Figure 8E). Surprisingly, when the enhancement factor
increases further, the nonmonotonous dependence disappears.
Instead, in a narrow region of intermediate δ values, the fraction
of cooperators decreases with increasing values of α. At the same
time, the extent of the full cooperation area increases while the
full defection region decreases in the considered (α, δ) parameter
space (Figure 8F).
While the underlying mechanism for the nonmonotonous
dependence on α is qualitatively identical to that reported before
when considering institutional punishment with absolute pay-
offs, the decrease of the level of cooperation at intermediate
values of δ and r = 3 as α increases requires special attention.
We note that when the value of r is large, low-degree coop-
erators can still have a positive payoff. For negative α, these
low-degree cooperators can even have the highest payoffs because
of the consideration of degree-normalized payoffs and sufficiently
high values of δ to weigh heavily on the defectors. Therefore,
cooperators dominate on all low-degree nodes and from there
spread further across the whole network and rise to dominance.
This atypical spreading is a unique consequence of the consid-
eration of the optimal distribution of negative incentives from
the punishment pool, and it highlights the importance of the
parameter α. For positive values of α namely, because most of
the negative incentives are then assigned to high-degree defec-
tors and there are only a few of those in the entire population
(Barabási and Albert, 1999), the majority of low-degree defectors
FIGURE 7 | Evolution of cooperation with institutional rewarding and
degree-normalized payoffs. Top row depicts the stationary fraction of
cooperators as a function of the average amount of available incentives δ
for different values of the distribution strength α. The enhancement
factor is r = 1 in (A), r = 2 in (B), and r = 3 in (C). Bottom row depicts
the contour plot of the fraction of cooperators as a function of α and δ,
as obtained for the enhancement factor r = 1 in (D), r = 2 in (E), and
r = 3 in (F).
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FIGURE 8 | Evolution of cooperation with institutional punishment
and degree-normalized payoffs. Top row depicts the stationary fraction
of cooperators as a function of the average amount of available
incentives δ for different values of the distribution strength α. The
enhancement factor is r = 1 in (A), r = 2 in (B), and r = 3 in (C). Bottom
row depicts the contour plot of the fraction of cooperators as a function
of α and δ, as obtained for the enhancement factor r = 1 in (D), r = 2 in
(E), and r = 3 in (F).
is not punished at all. The previously described spreading of
cooperators from the low-degree nodes outwards is therefore
impaired, which ultimately results in an overall lower stationary
fraction of cooperators. Instead of cooperation, for larger val-
ues of α the low-degree nodes “emit” defection throughout the
population.
DISCUSSION
To summarize, we have studied how to best distribute limited
institutional incentives in order to maximize public cooperation
on scale-free networks. We have considered both institutional
rewarding of cooperators and institutional punishment of defec-
tors, and we have also distinguished between absolute and degree-
normalized payoffs. Our key assumptions was that, since in
heterogeneous environments players have a different number of
partners, the incentives ought to be distributed by taking this
into account. This would be in agreement with the established
importance of degree heterogeneity for cooperation in evolu-
tionary games (Santos et al., 2006a, 2008, 2012). Traditionally,
however, previous research has considered the limited budged be
distributed equally among all the potential recipients of the incen-
tives, irrespective of the players status and influence within the
network. Accordingly, how to distribute the incentives to optimize
public cooperation was an important open problem.
We have found interesting solutions on how to optimally dis-
tribute the incentives based on each player’s social influence level,
the proxy for which are the number of social ties the players have
within the interaction network. We have shown that sharing the
incentives equally among all regardless of status is optimal only
if the social dilemma is strong and the propensity to contribute
to the common pool is thus weak, and if in addition the available
amount of incentives is intermediate. This result is valid for both
institutional punishment and institutional rewarding, and it does
not depend on whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs
count toward evolutionary fitness. However, if the environment
already favors cooperative behavior—when the public goods
game is characterized with a high enhancement factor—then it
is best to reward influential players more than low-degree players,
and this regardless of whether absolute or degree-normalized pay-
offs apply. For institutional punishment, on the other hand, the
solution of the optimization problem depends on whether abso-
lute or degree-normalized payoffs are used. We have shown that
degree-normalized payoffs require high-degree nodes be pun-
ished more lenient than low-degree nodes, while if absolute pay-
offs count, then high-degree nodes should be punished stronger
than low-degree nodes. In general, rewarding influential cooper-
ators strongly and punishing auxiliary defectors leniently appears
to be optimal for the successful evolution of public cooperation.
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In terms of solving actual common goods problems, our work
might have merit in situations with strong diversity in roles
and group sizes. One representative example of such a situa-
tion is climate change governance, where existing research has
shown that local institutions are an effective way to promote
the emergence of widespread cooperation (Vasconcelos et al.,
2013). Since our results are derived not only from local insti-
tutions, but take into account also the heterogeneous interac-
tion environment, they could offer further advice on how to
arrive at globally acceptable climate policies (Vasconcelos et al.,
2014).
While the evolution of institutions remains a puzzle (Sigmund
et al., 2010), their importance for enforcing socially acceptable
behavior in human societies can hardly be overstated. Although
institutionalized punishment appears to be prevailing, recent
research concerning the effectiveness of punishment, for exam-
ple related to antisocial punishment (Herrmann et al., 2008;
Rand and Nowak, 2011), reciprocity (Ohtsuki et al., 2009), and
reward (Rand et al., 2009; Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010), is ques-
tioning the aptness of sanctioning for elevating collaborative
efforts and raising social welfare. Indeed, although the major-
ity of previous studies addressing the “stick vs. carrot” dilemma
concluded that punishment is more effective than reward in
sustaining public cooperation (Sigmund, 2007), evidence sug-
gesting that rewards may be as effective as punishment and lead
to higher total earnings without potential damage to reputa-
tion or fear from retaliation is mounting (Dreber et al., 2008;
Szolnoki and Perc, 2010, 2012). In particular, Rand and Nowak
(2011) argue convincingly that healthy levels of cooperation are
likelier to be achieved through less destructive means. We hope
that our study will prove to be inspirational for further research
aimed at discerning the importance of positive and negative reci-
procity for human cooperation, as well as for looking closely
at their correlated effects (Szolnoki and Perc, 2013; Chen et al.,
submitted).
METHODS
We consider the evolutionary public goods game on the Barabási-
Albert scale-free network (Barabási and Albert, 1999; Albert and
Barabási, 2002). Each player x occupies one node of the network,
and it can choose between cooperation (sx = 1) and defection
(sx = 0) as the two competing strategies. To each public goods
game cooperators contribute the cost c = 1, while defectors con-
tribute nothing. The payoff of player x who is member in the
group Gy, which is centered on player y, depends on the size of
the group ky + 1 (here ky is also the degree of node y), on the
number of cooperators nc in the group, and on the enhance-
ment factor r. In addition to the payoffs stemming from the
public goods game, each group receives institutional incentives
Ix = (kx + 1)δ to be used either for rewarding cooperators or for
punishing defectors, where δ is the average amount of available
incentives.
When the incentives are used for rewarding, a cooperator y
with degree ky that is member in the group Gx thus receives the
payoff
Py,x = rcnc
kx + 1 − c +
sykαy
∑
z ∈Gx szkαz
Ix,
while a defector in the same group receives
Py,x = rcnc
kx + 1 ,
where α is the distribution strength. According to the definition
of the payoffs, for α > 0 high-degree nodes obtain larger rewards
than low-degree nodes, while for α < 0 low-degree nodes receive
a larger share from the incentive pool.
If the incentives are used for punishing defectors rather than
rewarding cooperators, then a cooperator y with degree ky that
is member in the group Gx receives Py,x = rcnckx+1 − c, while a
defector in the same group receives
Py,x = rcnc
kx + 1 −
(1 − sy)kαy
∑
z ∈Gx (1 − sz)kαz
Ix.
As by institutionalized rewarding, here to α > 0 implies high-
degree nodes are punished stronger than low-degree nodes, and
vice versa for α < 0.
Each player x participates in kx + 1 public goods games, which
are staged in groups that are centered on player x itself and on its
kx neighbors, respectively. The total payoff player x obtains is thus
Px =∑y∈Gx Px,y. After playing the games, a player is allowed to
learn from one of its randomly chosen neighbors y and update its
strategy accordingly. The probability of strategy change is given
by the Fermi function (Szabó and To˝ke, 1998; Szabó and Fáth,
2007)
f = 1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/K] , (1)
if we assume that absolute payoff are considered. However, pre-
vious research has emphasized also the importance of degree-
normalized payoffs (Masuda, 2007; Tomassini et al., 2007; Wu
et al., 2007; Szolnoki et al., 2008; Maciejewski et al., 2014), in
which case the probability of strategy change is
f = 1
1 + exp[(Px/(kx + 1) − Py/(ky + 1))/K] . (2)
We consider both absolute (Equation 1) and degree-normalized
(Equation 2) payoffs to be representative for the evolutionary
fitness of individual players. Especially for institutional pun-
ishment, the solution of the considered optimization problem
depends significantly on this difference. Without losing gener-
ality we set the uncertainly in the strategy adoption process to
K = 0.1 (Szolnoki et al., 2009), so that it is very likely that the
better performing players will be imitated, although it is also pos-
sible that players will occasionally learn from those performing
worse.
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